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Abstract—Motivated by the recently launched mobile data
trading markets (e.g., China Mobile Hong Kong’s 2nd exChange
Market), in this paper we study the mobile data trading problem
under the future data demand uncertainty. We introduce a
brokerage-based market, where sellers and buyers propose their
selling and buying quantities, respectively, to the trading platform
that matches the market supply and demand. To understand the
users’ realistic trading behaviors, a prospect theory (PT) model
from behavioral economics is proposed, which includes the widely
adopted expected utility theory (EUT) as a special case. Although
the PT modeling leads to a challenging non-convex optimization
problem, the optimal solution can be characterized by exploiting
the unimodal structure of the objective function. Building upon
our analysis, we design an algorithm to help estimate the user’s
risk preference and provide trading recommendations dynam-
ically, considering the latest market and usage information. It
is shown in our simulation that the risk preferences have a
significant impact on the user’s decision and outcome: a risk-
averse dominant user can guarantee a higher minimum profit
in the trading, while a risk-seeking dominant user can achieve a
higher maximum profit. By comparing with the EUT benchmark,
it is shown that a PT user with a low reference point is more
willing to buy mobile data. Moreover, when the probability of
high future data demand is low, a PT user is more willing to buy
mobile data due to the probability distortion comparing with an
EUT user.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
With the increasing computation and communication ca-
pabilities of mobile devices, global mobile data traffic has
been growing tremendously in the past few years [2], [3].
One way to alleviate the tension between the mobile data
demand and the network capacity is to utilize the spectrum
more efficiently, for example through spectrum sharing [4]–
[6]. Another way is to flatten the demand curve through pricing
[7]–[11]. More specifically, the mobile service providers have
been experimenting with several innovative pricing schemes,
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such as usage-based pricing, shared data plans, and sponsored
data pricing, to extract more revenue from the growing data
while sustaining a good service quality to users. However, the
above mentioned schemes do not fully take advantage of the
heterogeneous demands across all mobile users, and unused
data in the monthly plan will be cleared at the end of the
month. Recently, China Mobile Hong Kong (CMHK) launched
the first 4G data trading platform in the world, called the 2nd
exChange Market (2CM), which allows its users to trade their
monthly 4G mobile data quota directly with each other.1 In
this platform, a seller can sell some of his remaining data
quota of the current month on the platform with a desirable
price set by himself. If a buyer wants to buy some data at the
listed price, the platform will help complete the transaction
and transfer the proper data amount from the seller’s quota to
the buyer’s quota of that month.
However, there is a shortcoming of the current one-sided
2CM mechanism. More specifically, 2CM is a sellers’ market,
where a buyer cannot list his desirable buying price and
quantity. This means that a buyer needs to frequently check
the platform to see whether the current (lowest) selling price
is acceptable, while a seller does not know whether he can
sell the data at his proposed price immediately. In other words,
both buyers and sellers suffer from the incomplete information
of this one-sided market.
To improve the existing CMHK mechanism, we apply the
widely used Walrasian auction in the stock markets [15], [16].
In such a mechanism, both sellers and buyers can submit their
selling and buying prices and quantities to the platform. The
platform clears some transaction whenever the highest buying
price among buyers is no smaller than lowest selling price
among sellers. We are interested in understanding how a user
should participate in such a market under the uncertainty of
his future data usage, given his remaining data quota of the
current month and the current prices and quantities of other
sellers and buyers. More specifically, we would like to answer
the following questions: (i) Should a user choose to be a seller
or a buyer? (ii) How much should he sell or buy?
The key feature of the user’s decision problem is the future
data demand uncertainty, as there will be a satisfaction loss
if the user’s realized demand exceeds his monthly data quota
(after incorporating the results of data trading), and there will
be a waste of money if the user’s realized demand is less
than his monthly data quota (if the user purchases too much
1The three major mobile operators in China (China Mobile, China Unicom,
and China Telecomm) now all support such a trading platform [12]–[14].
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2data from the market). A typical approach of solving a user’s
decision problem with uncertainty is to maximize the user’s
expected utility, i.e., the expected utility theory (EUT) (e.g.,
[17]). Empirical evidences [18], [19], however, have shown
that the EUT model can deviate from real world observations
significantly due to the complicated psychological aspect of
human decision-making. Alternatively, researchers in behav-
ioral economics have shown that prospect theory (PT), which
establishes a more general theoretical model that includes EUT
as a special case, provides a psychologically more accurate
description of the decision making under uncertainty, and
explains some human behaviors that seem to be illogical under
EUT [18].2
More specifically, PT shows that a decision maker evaluates
an outcome significantly differently from what people have
commonly assumed in EUT in several aspects: (1) Impact of
reference point: A PT decision maker’s evaluation is based on
the relative gains or losses comparing to a reference point,
instead of the absolute values of the outcomes. (2) The s-
shaped asymmetric value function: A PT decision maker tends
to be risk-averse when considering gains and risk-seeking
when considering losses. Furthermore, the PT decision maker
is loss averse, in the sense that he strongly prefers avoiding
losses to achieving gains. (3) Probability distortion: A PT
decision maker tends to overweigh low probability events
and underweigh high probability events. As PT has been
shown to be more accurate than EUT in predicting human
behaviors [18], [19], [24], it has been applied to gain better
understandings of financial markets [21] and labor markets
[25]. However, there does not exist any PT-based studies in
understanding the users’ decisions in the mobile data trading
market.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we aim to understand a user’s realistic trading
behavior in a mobile data market, considering his future data
demand uncertainty.
In the first part of the paper, we focus on deriving the
optimal trading decision of a user based on his remaining
quota and possible demand till the end of the billing cycle,
without considering future possible tradings.3 Specifically, we
formulate the problem as a two-stage optimization problem,
where the user decides whether to be a seller or a buyer
in Stage I (at a particularly given trading time), and then
determines his selling quantity (as a seller) or buying quantity
(as a buyer) in Stage II. Besides considering the optimal
decision of a risk-neutral user in the EUT framework, we will
also consider the impact of the user’s risk preferences on the
decision. To be more specific, a risk-seeking decision maker
2The expected utility theory (EUT), which is based on an axiomatic system,
has an underlying assumption that decision makers are rational and risk-
averse when facing uncertainties [20]. PT is one of the most widely used
generalizations of EUT, as PT incorporates human emotions and psychology
into the utility theory [21]–[23].
3For example, the billing cycle of a monthly data plan is a month. In a more
general case, a user may trade multiple times in the same billing cycle. We
can model the user’s decision problem in this general setting as a Dynamic
Programing (DP) problem, which is much more challenging to solve. We
leave this to the future work.
is aggressive and wants to achieve a high maximum profit
even with the risk of a low minimum profit, while a risk-
averse decision maker is conservative and wants to guarantee
a satisfactory level of minimum profit. The PT provides a com-
prehensive analytical framework for understanding the optimal
decisions of different types of decision makers. However, the
corresponding optimization is non-convex hence is challenging
to solve. Nevertheless, by exploiting the unimodal structure in
each sub-interval of the feasible set, we can obtain the globally
optimal solution of the non-convex optimization problem. We
further discuss the practical insights by comparing the analysis
under PT and EUT for the case with binary outcomes.
In the second part of the paper, we introduce an algorithm
for autonomous and adaptive data trading based on the theory
developed in the first part. In such an algorithm, a user
can trade multiple times during a billing cycle, with each
trading decisions being made in a “myopic” fashion without
considering the possible future trading opportunities. Since a
user’s risk preference will significantly impact the result of
this algorithm, we design another algorithm to estimate the
user’s risk preference. We implement the algorithms on an
Android app4 and evaluate our algorithm’s performances under
different risk preferences through numerical examples.
Our key contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• Behavioral economics modeling of uncertainty: We use
prospect theory to model the user’s trading behavior
under future data demand uncertainty. We consider all
three key characteristics of PT and derive key insights
that characterize the optimal selling and buying decisions.
• Characterization of the optimal trading solution: Despite
the non-convexity of the user’s decision problem, we are
able to obtain the globally optimal solution by exploiting
the convexity and unimodality in different sub-intervals
of the feasible set. We further evaluate how different
behavioral characteristics (i.e., reference point, probabil-
ity distortion, and s-shaped valuation) affect this optimal
decision.
• Engineering insights on risk preferences: Comparing with
the benchmark EUT result, we show that a PT user with
a low reference point is more willing to buy mobile data
and less willing to sell mobile data. Moreover, a PT
user is even more willing to buy mobile data when the
probability of high future data demand is small, mainly
due to the probability distortion.
• Evaluation of algorithms: We evaluate the user’s profit
under our proposed algorithm numerically. Based on
this, we show that a risk-averse user can achieve the
highest minimum profit, a risk-seeking user can achieve
the highest maximum profit, and a risk-neutral user can
achieve the highest average profit.
Next we review the literature in Section II. In Section III,
we formulate the user’s utility functions under both EUT and
4Notice that the app is based on the real CMHK market, hence it is different
from our theory in two aspects. First, there is no buyer’s market, and the seller
will make decision at the price slightly lower than the minimum selling price.
Second, a user can make several decisions during a billing cycle, based on
his current quota and future data demand uncertainty.
3PT. In Section IV, we compute the optimal user decision,
and illustrate the insights through a special case of binary
outcomes. In Section V, we explain the implementation of
our multi-trade algorithm on an Android app, which estimates
the user’s risk preferences and compute the optimal trading
decisions accordingly. In Section VI, we numerically evaluate
the user’s optimal decision based on several model parameters,
and compute the overall profit that our algorithm can achieve
in a billing cycle under different risk preferences. We conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Mobile Data Pricing
Previous studies have focused on several different mobile
data pricing schemes, such as usage-based, flat-rate, cap pric-
ing, time-dependent pricing, location dependent pricing, and
shared data plans [7]–[11]. For example, Zhang et al. in [7]
studied the ISP’s revenue maximization problem with three
different pricing schemes, including flat-rate scheme, usage
based scheme, and cap scheme. Ha et al. in [8] showed that
time dependent pricing schemes can reduce the ISPs’ need
of over-provision network resources at peak times, hence can
reduce the ISPs’ operational costs. Ma et al. in [9] showed
that time and location aware pricing for mobile data traffic
can incentivize users to smooth traffic and reduce network
congestion. The authors in [10] and [11] showed that shared
data plan can decrease the average unit usage cost for the
users by allowing multiple users share the same pool of data
quota. In this paper, we consider the mobile data trading
among all the users subscribing to the same service (such as
4G) from a mobile operator, hence takes advantage of the
heterogeneous demands of a larger number of users in the
mobile data market.
B. User Decisions in Communication Networks and Smart
Grids under PT
The research of using PT to understand user decisions in
communication networks and smart grids is at its infancy
stage. Due to the complexity of modeling and analysis, all
previous literature have only considered one or two of the
three key features of PT in the modeling. Li et al. in [26], [27]
and Yang et al. in [28] compared the equilibrium strategies
of a binary decision game among wireless network end-
users under EUT and PT, where they considered a linear
value function with the probability distortion. Xiao et al. in
[29] and Wang et al. in [30] characterized the unique Nash
Equilibrium of an energy exchange game among microgrids
under PT, where they considered a linear value function with
the probability distortion. Yu et al. in [31] studied a secondary
wireless operator’s spectrum investment problem, where they
considered a linear probability distortion and s-shaped value
function. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
first work that studies a mobile data trading problem under
PT, where we capture all three characteristics of PT when
modeling and analyzing the problem. As a result, we are able
to gain a more thorough understanding of the user’s optimal
decisions based on his specific risk preferences and derive
more insights.
User Profile: 
Quota: 𝑄 GB/Month 
Demand: 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 
Preference: v 𝑥 ,𝑤 𝑝 ,𝑅𝑝 
 
Stage I: Sell or Buy? 
Stage II: How many GB? 
Buyers’ Market Sellers’ Market 
Price (per GB) Available (GB) Price (per GB) Available (GB) 
𝜋𝑏
 𝑚𝑚𝑥 = $16 3000 𝜋𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑖 = $20 4000 $13 1000 $21 500 $11 600 $24 800 
… … … … 
Fig. 1. An example of the trading decision with the data trading platform.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the trading decision of a single
user5 in a mobile data trading platform. We first introduce the
mobile data trading market in Section III-A. Then we discuss
the user’s profile in Section III-B and his risk preferences
model in Section III-C. In Section III-D, we formulate the
user’s two-stage trading decision problem.
A. Mobile Data Trading Market
We consider a two-sided mobile data trading platform as
shown in Fig. 1. The seller’s market lists the sellers’ proposed
prices and the corresponding amount of data available for sale
at each price.6 If a buyer wants to purchase some data quota
immediately, he can choose to purchase at the minimum selling
price pimins in the seller’s market. In Fig. 1, we have pi
min
s =
$20. Similarly, the buyer’s market lists buyers’ proposed prices
and the corresponding amount of data demand at each price.
If a seller wants to sell some data quota immediately, he can
choose to sell at the maximum buying price pimaxb . In Fig. 1,
we have pimaxb = $16.
7
Note that in Fig. 1, the maximum buying price (pimaxb =
$16) is lower than the minimum selling price (pimins = $20).
This is because those selling offers with prices less than $16
have already been cleared by the market, so are those buying
requests with prices higher than $20.
5Note that there are many users in the market, and a single user’ decision
will not significantly impact on the market. So from a single user’s point
of view, the market can be viewed as exogenously given and stochastically
changing.
6Under the continuous double auction mechanism, every user can make his
trading decision (i.e., his role, price, and quantity) at any time. He will submit
his decision to the platform as his bid. When the platform receives a user’s
bid, it will try to match the existing bids with this new bid, or keep this new
bid online if it cannot be matched immediately.
7As evidenced in the real CMHK market, we assume that the quantity
associated with the minimum selling price is large enough, such that a single
buyer who wants to complete the trade immediately can simply consider a
single price pimins . Similar to the buying decision, we assume that the quantity
associated with the maximum buying price is large enough such that a single
seller who wants to sell his data immediately can simply consider a single
price pimaxb .
4B. User’s Profile
Remaining Data Quota: For the analytical model in Sections
III and IV, we assume that the user makes the trading decision
without considering potential future tradings in the same
billing cycle.8 We use Q to denote his remaining data quota
at the time of decision. For example, if the user subscribes to
a data plan of 5 GB per month and he has consumed 2 GB
so far, then Q = 3 GB for the remaining time of the billing
cycle.
Demand Uncertainty: The user has an uncertainty regarding
his future data demand from now till the end of the billing
cycle. We assume that his future data demand d follows a
discrete distribution over the set of I possible values, {di:
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}, d1 < . . . < dI}, with the corresponding
probability mass function P(d = di) = pi with
∑I
i=1 pi = 1.
9
To avoid the trivial case, we assume that d1 < Q and dI > Q.
We further define ıˆ as the index that dıˆ < Q and dıˆ+1 ≥ Q.
Satisfaction Loss: The user’s data plan has a two-part
pricing tariff, where the user pays a fixed fee for the data
consumption up to a monthly quota (5 GB in the previous
example), and a linear high usage-based cost for any extra data
consumption. Such a pricing model is widely used by major
operators like AT&T in US and CMHK in Hong Kong [7].
Specifically, the user needs to pay a price of κ ($/GB)10 if the
user’s future data demand d exceeds his remaining data quota
Q. We define the satisfaction loss of the user as the additional
payment (which is a non-positive term) for exceeding the
monthly quota:
L(y) =
{
0, if y ≥ 0,
κy, if y < 0,
(1)
where y < 0 means that the quota is exceeded. Without data
trading, y = Q− d.
C. Risk Preferences
To model the user’s data trading problem under future data
demand uncertainty, we consider the following three features
of PT, namely reference point Rp, s-shaped value function
v(x), and probability distortion function w(p) [18], [34].
1) Reference Point: The reference point Rp indicates the
user’s physiological target of the outcome. The user considers
an outcome a gain if it is higher than the reference point, and
a loss if it is lower than the reference point. A high reference
point means that the user is more likely to treat an outcome as
a loss, and a low reference point means that he is more likely
to treat an outcome as a gain. This will significantly affect the
user’s subjective valuation of the outcome, as we will explain
next.
2) S-shaped Asymmetrical Value Function: Fig. 2(a) il-
lustrates the value function v(x), which maps an objective
8We conducted a survey with over 50 CMHK users, and found that users’
decisions are not fully rational and are usually myopic due to bounded
rationality [32]. More specifically, around 60% of the users trade only once
during one billing cycle.
9Mathematically, when we choose the number of possible realizations I to
be large enough, the discrete distribution can well approximate a continuous
distribution [33].
10For example, for a 4G CMHK user, κ = 60.
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Fig. 2. The s-shaped asymmetrical value function v(x) and the probability
distortion function w(p) in PT.
outcome x to the user’s subjective valuation v(x). Notice that
all the outcomes are measured relatively to the reference point
Rp, which is normalized to x = 0 in the figure. Behavioral
studies show that the function v(x) is s-shaped, which is
concave in the gain region (i.e., x > 0, when the outcome is
larger than the reference point) and convex in the loss region
(i.e., x < 0, when the outcome is smaller than the reference
point). Moreover, the impact of loss is larger than the gain,
i.e., |v(−x)| > v(x) for any x > 0.11 A commonly used value
function in the PT literature is [18]
v(x) =
{
xβ , if x ≥ 0,
− λ(−x)β , if x < 0, (2)
where 0 < β ≤ 1 and λ ≥ 1. Here β is the risk parameter,
where a smaller β means that the value function is more
concave in the gain region, hence the user is more risk-averse
in gains. Meanwhile, a smaller β also means that the value
function is more convex in the loss region, hence the user is
more risk-seeking in losses. Under a high reference point Rp,
the user is more likely to encounter losses, hence a smaller β
means that the user is more risk-seeking dominant. Under a
low reference point Rp, however, a smaller β means that the
user is more risk-averse dominant. The valuation of the loss
region is further characterized by the loss penalty parameter
λ, where a larger λ indicates that the user is more loss averse.
We note that the value function in EUT is a special case
of PT, with the parameter choices λ = β = 1, and the value
function becomes a linear function of v(x) = x. In this case,
the choice of reference point only leads to a constant shift
of the value function without affecting the user’s decision.
Without loss of generality, we will choose Rp = 0 for the
EUT case.
3) Probability Distortion: Fig. 2(b) illustrates the probabil-
ity distortion function w(p), which captures humans’ psycho-
11To better understand the s-shaped value function, consider the following
two lottery settings. Lottery A1: 50% to win $200, and 50% to win $0;
Lottery A2: 100% to win $100. Experimental results [18], [19] showed that
most people prefer Lottery A2 to A1. The result reflects that people are risk-
averse in gains (i.e., β < 1). Next we further consider another two lottery
settings. Lottery B1: 50% to win $100, and 50% to loss $100; Lottery B2:
100% to win $0. Experimental results [18], [19] showed that most people
prefer Lottery B2 to B1. The result reflects that people are loss averse (i.e.,
λ > 1).
5Stage I 
The user chooses to be a buyer or a seller (i.e., problem (4)). 
Stage II 
Buyer chooses his buying 
quantity 𝑞𝑏 with buying price 
𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑚𝑚 (i.e. problem (5)). 
Stage II 
Seller chooses his selling 
quantity 𝑞𝑠 with selling price 
𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑚𝑚 (i.e. problem (6)). 
Fig. 3. Two-Stage Optimization.
logical over-weighting of low probability events and under-
weighting of high probability events [18]. A commonly used
probability distortion function is [34]
w(p) = exp(−(− ln p)µ), 0 < µ ≤ 1, (3)
where p is the objective probability of an outcome and w(p)
is the corresponding subjective probability. Here µ is the
probability distortion parameter, which reveals how a per-
son’s subjective evaluation distorts the objective probability.
A smaller µ means a larger distortion.12
When µ = 1, we have w(p) = p, which refers to the case
of EUT without probability distortion.
D. Two-Stage Decision Problem
Next we derive the user’s expected utilities of being a buyer
and a seller, respectively, with the remaining data quota Q and
a probability distribution of the future data demand d.
Fig. 3 shows how each user makes the trading decision in
two stages.13 In Stage I, he decides whether to sell or to buy
in the market. In Stage II, he decides the price and quantity
as a seller or as a buyer, depending on his choice in Stage I.
1) Stage I’s Problem: In Stage I, a user makes a decision
a ∈ A = {s, b}, where s and b correspond to being a seller
and a buyer, respectively. We use u(a) to denote the user’
maximum utility that can be achieved under the choice of a
(through the optimized decisions in Stage II), as defined in (5)
and (6). Then, the user’s Stage I optimization problem is
max
a∈{s,b}
u(a). (4)
2) Stage II’s Problem: A buyer in Stage II needs to decide
his buying quantity qb, given the minimum selling price pimins
as discussed in Section III-A. Thus, the buyer’s problem is to
12To better understand PT, consider the following lottery settings. Lottery
A1: 1% to win $99, and 99% to loss $1; Lottery A2: 100% to win $0.
Experimental results [18], [19] showed that most people prefer Lottery A1 to
A2. The result reflects that people will have a subjective probability distortion
of small probability events (i.e., µ < 1).
13The two-stage game model and the simultaneous seller-buyer decision
model lead to the same result. We present it as a two-stage game for the ease
of exposition.
maximize his expected utility:14
u(b) = max
qb≥0
U(b, qb) =
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v(−pimins qb
+ L(Q+ qb − di)−Rp), (5)
where pimins qb is the cost for buying the data at the price pi
min
s ,
and L(Q+ qb − di) is the satisfaction loss after trading if the
future data demand is di.
On the other hand, a seller in Stage II needs to decide his
selling quantity qs, given the maximum buying price pimaxb :
u(s) = max
qs≥0
U(s, qs) =
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v(pi
max
b qs
+ L(Q− qs − di)−Rp), (6)
where pimaxb qs is the revenue obtained from selling the data
at the price pimaxb , and L(Q− qs − di) is the satisfaction loss
after trading if the future data demand is di.
In the next section, we will solve the user’s two-stage opti-
mal trading problems (4), (5), and (6) by backward induction.
IV. SOLVING THE TWO-STAGE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we first derive the user’s optimal selling or
buying decision in Stage II. Then, we consider whether the
user chooses to be a seller or a buyer in Stage I by comparing
his maximum achievable utilities under both cases.
Problems (5) and (6) are challenging analytically due to the
non-convexity of the s-shaped value function v(x), especially
under an arbitrary reference point. To obtain clear engineering
insights, we focus on two choices of reference points in the
following analysis:
• High reference point Rp = 0: It reflects the user’s
expectation of observing the lowest possible demand level
d1 hence having no excessive demand.
• Low reference point Rp = κ(Q− dI) < 0: It reflects the
user’s expectation of observing the highest possible de-
mand level dI and paying for the corresponding excessive
demand (without trading).
The high reference point refers to the best case scenario
without trading, while the low reference point refers to the
worst case scenario without trading. Best case and worst case
scenarios are widely used concepts in risk management [35],
and are frequently used as benchmarks for evaluating invest-
ment performances [21]. For a particular given outcome, it is
more likely to be considered as a gain under Rp = κ(Q−dI)
than under Rp = 0.
To get around the non-convexity issue of problems (5) and
(6), we partition the whole feasible range of the decision
variable into several sub-intervals based on the piece-wise
linearity of the satisfaction loss function L(y) in (1), such that
the objective function in each sub-interval is either convex or
unimodal. We then compute the unique optimal solution by
14For all the optimization problems discussed in this paper, we will consider
the three features of PT as discussed in Section III-C, and EUT is a special
case under proper parameter choices. We will not repeat this point later on.
6𝑑2 − Q  𝑑3 − Q  
𝑈
(𝑏,𝑞 𝑏) 
0 
𝑞𝑏 
(a) U(b, qb)
Q− d2  Q− d1  
𝑈
(𝑠,𝑞 𝑠) 
0 
𝑞𝑠 
(b) U(s, qs)
Fig. 4. Examples of (a) U(b, qb) in (5) under Rp = 0 and (b) U(s, qs) in
(6) under Rp = 0.
confining the problem to each sub-interval, and finally iden-
tify the global optimum by comparing the optimal objective
function values of all sub-intervals.
In order to understand the impact of the risk parameters
on the optimal trading decisions, we further consider a special
case with binary possible demand I = 2, in which case we are
able to characterize the user’s optimal decision in closed-form.
A. Stage II: Solving Buyer’s Problem (5)
1) General Case of I ≥ 2: The way of solving problem (5)
will depend on the choice of reference point. Under the high
reference point Rp = 0, we will partition the whole feasible
range of qb into I − ıˆ + 1 sub-intervals based on I possible
realizations of di. We will show that U(b, qb) is convex in
each sub-interval, which implies that the optimal q∗b for each
sub-interval is one of the two boundary points. An example of
U(b, qb) under Rp = 0 is shown in Fig. 4(a). In this example,
we assume I = 3, where d1 < Q and Q < d2 < d3, so that
ıˆ = 1. As we can see from Fig. 4(a), the feasible range of
qb can be divided into three sub-intervals: [0, d2 − Q], [d2 −
Q, d3−Q], and [d3−Q,∞). The function U(b, qb) is convex
in each sub-interval, so that we can find the global optimal qb
by comparing the function values at the boundary points of the
sub-intervals (i.e., U(b, 0), U(b, d2 −Q), and U(b, d3 −Q)).
Under the low reference point Rp = κ(Q − dI), we can
show that U(b, qb) is a concave function in each sub-interval.
Thus, the optimal q∗b for each sub-interval is either at one
of the boundary points or at the critical point (where the first
order derivative equals zero). As long as we obtain the optimal
solution for each sub-interval, we can compute the globally
optimal solution by comparing the I − ıˆ + 1 sub-intervals’
optimal points.
Before introducing the following theorem, we first define
Xb = {qb : ∂U(b, qb)
∂qb
= 0 under Rp = κ(Q− dI)}, (7)
which is the set of critical points (the points at which the
first order derivative of the user’s utility equals zero). We can
also prove that there are at most I critical points in the whole
feasible range (i.e., |Xb| ≤ I) in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. The buyer’s optimal buying quantity by solving
problem (5) under the high reference point Rp = 0 is
q∗b = arg max
qb∈{Q−di,i=ıˆ+1,...,I}∪{0}
{U(b, qb)}, (8)
and that under the low reference point Rp = κ(Q− dI) is
q∗b = arg max
qb∈{Q−di,i=ıˆ+1,...,I}∪Xb∪{0}
{U(b, qb)}. (9)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.
Next, we show the impact of the value function, probability
distortion, and reference point in the special case of binary
outcomes.
2) Special Case of I = 2: To better illustrate the impact of
various parameters on the buyer’s optimal decision, we next
consider the buyer’s optimization problem with I = 2 possible
demands. More specifically, there are two possible realizations
of the future data demand: d1 = dl and d2 = dh, with 0 <
dl < Q < dh. The probability of observing a high demand dh
is p, and the probability of observing low demand dl is 1− p.
We first define buyer’s threshold price under different
reference points. As we will show in Theorem 2, the optimal
buying amount equals dh−Q when the minimum selling price
pimins is below the buyer’s threshold price:
p¯iEUTb , κp, p¯iPThb , κ
[
w(p)
w(p) + w(1− p)
] 1
β
,
p¯iPTlb ,
κw(p)
w(1− p) + w(p) . (10)
Theorem 2. The buyer’s optimal buying solution by solving
problem (5) under EUT is
q∗b =
{
dh −Q, if pimins < p¯iEUTb ,
0, if pimins ≥ p¯iEUTb .
(11)
His optimal buying solution by solving problem (5) under PT
with high reference point Rp = 0 is
q∗b =
{
dh −Q, if pimins < p¯iPThb ,
0, if pimins ≥ p¯iPThb ,
(12)
and that with low reference point Rp = κ(Q− dh) is
q∗b =
dh −Q, if pimins < p¯iPTlb ,
0, if pimins ≥ p¯iPTlb and β = 1,
κ(Q−dh)[
w(p)(κ−pimins )β
w(1−p)pimins
] 1
β−1
+pimins
, if pimins ≥ p¯iPTlb and β < 1.
(13)
Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 1, and the proof is
given in Appendix B. The result in (11) follows directly from
(12) and (13) by setting β = µ = λ = 1.
In (11) and (12), we observe that the optimal buying
quantity is discontinuous at the buyer’s threshold price. This
is due to the linearity of utility function in the EUT case and
the convexity of utility function in the PT case with Rp = 0.
Details are given in Appendix B.
From Theorem 2, we have the following observations on
the impact of reference point when we fix the probability
distortion parameter µ = 1 (hence removing the impact of
probability distortion).
Observation 1. (PT vs EUT under the high reference point)
When µ = 1 and Rp = 0, we have p¯iPThb < p¯i
EUT
b . This
means that under a high reference point, a PT buyer is less
7willing to purchase mobile data than an EUT buyer.
Observation 2. (PT vs EUT under the low reference point)
When µ = 1 and Rp = κ(Q − dh), we have p¯iPTlb = p¯iEUTb .
However, the optimal buying quantity q∗b of the PT buyer in
(13) is no smaller than that of the EUT buyer in (11) under
the same price pimins . This means that under a low reference
point, a PT buyer is more willing to purchase mobile data
than an EUT buyer.
Notice that buying data reduces the risk that the future
data demand exceeds the quota. As we have mentioned in
Section III-C, a smaller β means that the buyer is more risk-
seeking in losses and more risk-averse in gains. Under a high
expectation (e.g., Rp = 0), the buyer with a smaller β (in the
PT case) is more risk-seeking dominant and will not buy data.
Under a low expectation (e.g., Rp = κ(Q − dh) < 0), the
buyer is more risk-averse dominant, and will buy an amount
equal to dh−Q, which will completely eliminate the risk that
the future data demand exceeds the updated quota dh.
B. Stage II: Solving Seller’s Problem (6)
1) General Case of I ≥ 2: To solve problem (6) under
both Rp = 0 and Rp = κ(Q − dI), we partition the whole
interval of qs into ıˆ+ 1 sub-intervals. We show that U(s, qs)
has a special unimodal structure in each sub-interval. Since the
first order derivative of a unimodal function will cross zero at
most once in each sub-interval, and thus the optimal q∗s for
each sub-interval is either at one of the boundary points or at
the critical point (where the first order derivative equals zero).
Then, by comparing the ıˆ+ 1 optimal points, we can find the
global optimal solution. An example of U(s, qs) under Rp = 0
is shown in Fig. 4(b). In this example, we assume I = 3, where
d1 < d2 < Q and Q < d3, so that ıˆ = 2. As we can see from
Fig. 4(b), the feasible range of qs can be divided into three
sub-intervals: [0, Q− d2], [Q− d2, Q− d1], and [Q− d1,∞).
The function U(s, qs) is unimodal in each sub-interval, so that
we can find the global optimal q∗s by comparing the boundary
function values of the sub-intervals (i.e., U(s, 0), U(s,Q−d2),
and U(s,Q− d1)) and the function values of critical points if
they exist (i.e., U(s, qs), qs ∈ {qs : ∂U(s,qs)∂qs = 0 under Rp =
0}).
Before introducing the following theorem, we first define
Xsh = {qs : ∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
= 0 under Rp = 0}
and
Xsl = {qs : ∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
= 0 under Rp = κ(Q− dI)}, (14)
which are the sets of critical points (the points at which the
first order derivatives of the user’s utility equal zero). We can
also prove that there are at most I critical points in the whole
feasible range under both Rp = 0 and Rp = κ(Q− dI) (i.e.,
|Xsh| ≤ I and |Xsh| ≤ I) in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. The seller’s optimal selling quantity q∗s of prob-
lem (6) under PT with the high reference point Rp = 0 is
q∗s = arg max
qs∈{Q−di,i=1,...,ˆı}∪Xsh∪{0}
{U(s, qs)}, (15)
and that with the low reference point Rp = κ(Q− dI) is
q∗s = arg max
qs∈{Q−di,i=1,...,ˆı}∪Xsl∪{0}
{U(s, qs)}. (16)
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B. Next, we
show the impact of the value function, probability distortion,
and reference point for the special case of binary outcomes.
2) Special Case of I = 2: To better illustrate the insights,
we next consider the seller’s optimization problem with I = 2
possible demands.
We first define seller’s threshold price under different risk
preferences. As we will show in Theorem 4, the optimal selling
amount equals Q− dl when the maximum buying price pimaxb
is above the seller’s threshold price. The seller’s threshold
prices p¯iEUTs , p¯i
PTh
s , and p¯i
PTl
s are the unique
15 solutions of
the following three equations:
p¯iEUTs = κp, (17)
λ(κ− p¯iPThs )βw(p)
(p¯iPThs )
βw(1− p)
(
1 +
κ(dh −Q)
(κ− p¯iPThs )(Q− dl)
)β−1
= 1,
(18)
w(1− p){[(p¯iPTls − κ)Q+ κdh − p¯iPTls dl]β − [κ(dh −Q)]β}
= λw(p)[(κ− p¯iPTls )(Q− dl)]β . (19)
Theorem 4. The seller’s optimal selling quantity in problem
(6) under EUT is
q∗s =
{
Q− dl, if pimaxb > p¯iEUTs ,
0, if pimaxb ≤ p¯iEUTs .
(20)
His optimal selling quantity in problem (6) under PT with the
high reference point Rp = 0 is
q∗s =
Q− dl, if pimaxb > p¯iPThs ,
0, if pimaxb ≤ p¯iPThs and β = 1,
κ
κ−pimax
b
(dh−Q)(
w(1−p)pimax
b
β
w(p)λ(κ−pimax
b
)β
) 1
β−1−1
, if pimaxb ≤ p¯iPThs and β < 1,
(21)
and that with the low reference point Rp = κ(Q− dh) is
q∗s =
{
Q− dl, if pimaxb > p¯iPThs ,
0, if pimaxb ≤ p¯iPThs .
(22)
Theorem 4 is a special case of Theorem 3, and the proof of
Theorem 4 is given in Appendix D. The result in (20) follows
directly from (21) and (22) by setting β = µ = λ = 1.
In (20) and (22), we observe that the optimal selling quantity
q∗s is discontinuous at the seller’s threshold price. This is
due to the linearity of utility function in the EUT case
and the unimodality of utility function in the PT case with
Rp = κ(Q− dh). Details are given in Appendix D.
From Theorem 4, we have the following observations on
the impact of reference point when we fix the probability
distortion parameter µ = 1.
Observation 3. (PT vs EUT under the high reference point)
When µ = 1 and Rp = 0, we have p¯iPThs < p¯i
EUT
s . This
15The proof of the uniqueness is in Appendix D.
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Fig. 5. Screenshots of the app: (a) Homepage, (b) Market Information, and
(c) Settings.
means that under a high reference point, a PT seller is more
willing to sell mobile data than an EUT seller.
Observation 4. (PT vs EUT under the low reference point)
When µ = 1 and Rp = κ(Q − dh), we have p¯iPTls > p¯iEUTs .
This means that under a low reference point, a PT seller is
less willing to sell mobile data than an EUT seller.
Contrary to buying data, selling data increases the risk
that the future data demand exceeds the quota. Under a
high expectation (e.g., Rp = 0), the seller with a smaller β
is more risk-seeking dominant and will sell a large amount
(Q−dl). Under a low expectation (e.g., Rp = κ(Q−dh) < 0),
the seller with a smaller β is more risk-averse dominant and
will not sell data.
In Stage I, the user decides whether to be a seller or a buyer
by comparing the maximum utilities that he can achieve in
both cases.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF MOBILE DATA TRADING
Building upon our theoretical analysis in Sections III and
IV, here we consider several issues related to the practical
implementations. We first discuss the mobile data trading
algorithm that allows a user to trade multiple times during
a billing cycle to adjust his trading decision in Section V-A.
Then we introduce a practical algorithm to estimate the user’s
risk preferences in Section V-B.
Since a user’s prediction of his future data demand may
not be accurate, the user may want to make multiple data
trading decisions as the time passes by. Hence, we design a
mobile data trading algorithm to facilitate a user to make smart
decisions over time in a semi-automatic fashion, which reduces
the user’s need of frequently checking the market prices and
estimating the future data demand. The mobile data trading
algorithm relies on Algorithm 1 (discussed in Section V-B) to
estimate the user’s risk preferences, and can provide trading
suggestions at any time based on the current market price, the
user’s current usage, and his risk preferences. Our algorithm
is implemented as an Android app, the interface of which is
shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 5(a) shows the homepage screen of the
Android app, which involves four areas: calculator, market
history, usage history, and setting. Fig. 5(b) shows the current
CMHK market information, which includes the selling prices
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Fig. 6. Flowchart of the algorithm (Android app).
and quantities. Fig. 5(c) shows various system parameters that
can be changed by the user, such as the trading notification
frequency.16
A. Mobile Data Trading Algorithm Design
Fig. 6 illustrates the key function modules of the mobile
app:
• Market Information: The app retrieves the CMHK mobile
data trading market information, in order to determine the
minimum selling price pimins and the maximum buying
price pimaxb .
17
• Trading Frequency: We assume that the app will make
T trading decision in a billing cycle18. In the following
discussions, for the ease of exposition we assume the
trading frequency is once a day, i.e., the user makes T =
30 trading decisions during a monthly billing cycle.19
• Usage: The app records the user’s usage everyday. We
denote the actual data usage of day ˆ in month mˆ as
δm,j , where month mˆ has Tmˆ days.
• Demand Prediction: We use an adaptive model for the
user’s future data demand prediction. Specifically, as-
suming that we are on day ˆ of month mˆ, we aim to
estimate the distribution of the future data demand of the
remaining time (i.e., from day ˆ to day Tmˆ) of month mˆ
by considering the previous I month’s (denoted as month
mˆ−1, ..., mˆ− I) data usage during the same time period
(i.e., from day ˆ+1 to day Tmˆ). The predicted data usage
of the last Tmˆ − ˆ days in month mˆ for i ∈ I is
di :=
Tmˆ−i∑
j=ˆ+1
δmˆ−i,j . (23)
16The user may not want to be disturbed by frequent notifications. He can
adjust this by either turning off the notification alarm, or reduce the notification
frequency to a low level, e.g., once per 24 hour.
17Recall from Section I-B that there is no buyer’s market in the actual
CMHK platform, so pimaxb in problem (6) is not well defined. To address
this issue, we note that although different sellers can set different prices in
the CMHK market, the system will always try to satisfy the buyers’ demands
with the lowest selling price. Based on the fact that the selling quantity at
the minimum selling price is often very large (e.g., 4740 GB in Fig. 5(b) on
June 22, 2016), the seller is not able to sell his data at a price higher than the
minimum selling price, so we can assume that the maximum buying price is
the same as minimum selling price, i.e., pimaxb = pi
min
s .
18By default setting, the app will send every trading suggestion as a
notification. The user can change the notification frequency as shown in
Fig. 5(c).
19The optimal trading decision may be not to sell or buy any data, i.e.,
skipping some of the trading opportunities.
9Algorithm 1: Estimation of Value Function Parameters λ
and β
1 Input: Quota (Qˆ), risk parameters (µ, Rp),
usage(δmˆ−i,j , i = 0, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , Tmˆ−i), market
information (pimins , pi
max
b ).
2 for ˆ = 1 to Tmˆ do
3 for i = 1 to I do
4 di :=
Tmˆ−i∑
j=ˆ+1
δmˆ−i,j and pi := 1/I
5 dmin := arg mini∈I di and dmax := arg maxi∈I di
6 Users input the indifference prices (pibind and pi
s
ind)
7 Substitute dmin, dmax, pibind, and pi
s
ind into (25) and
(26), and solve them for λ and β
8 Set λˆ := λ and βˆ := β
9 Update Qˆ according to (24)
10 Output: λ :=
∑Tmˆ
ˆ=1 λˆ
Tmˆ
and β :=
∑Tmˆ
ˆ=1 βˆ
Tmˆ
We will use them to predict the future data demand of
the rest of month mˆ with an equal probability. That is,
pi = 1/I for i ∈ I.
• Quota: The remaining quota from day ˆ to the end of
month mˆ is Qˆ, which corresponds to Q in Sections
III and IV. The value of Qˆ is an input to the utility
maximization problem in (5) and (6), which is updated
every day as follows:
Qˆ :=
{
Qˆ−1 + q∗ˆ−1 − δmˆ,ˆ−1, if ˆ ≥ 2,
Qˆ, if ˆ = 1.
(24)
Here q∗ˆ−1 is the trading quantity on day ˆ−1 that we will
discuss below, and it can be zero if no trading happens on
that day. Thus, the first line of (24) means that the quota
is updated based on the trading quantity q∗
jˆ−1 and usage
δmˆ,ˆ−1, while the second line means the initialization of
the month quota to Qˆ on the first day of the month.
• Risk Parameters: The risk parameters include the value
function parameters β and λ in (2), the probability
distortion parameter µ in (3), and the reference point Rp
in (5) and (6).
• Utility Maximization Problem: The app solves problem
(4), which involves solving (5) and (6), based on the
market information (pimaxb and pi
min
s ), the user’s current
quota Qˆ, the risk parameters, usage, and future data
demand prediction in (23). The output of the utility
maximization problem on day ˆ is the optimal buying or
selling quantity q∗ˆ , which in turn will update the quota
as in (24). Note that a positive q∗j means the optimal
buying quantity (i.e., output of (5)), while a negative q∗j
means the optimal selling quantity (i.e., the output of (6)
multiplied by (−1)).
The detailed algorithm for computing the data trading
decisions with user’s specific risk preferences is shown in
Appendix E.
B. Risk Parameter Estimation
Since the trading decision is user-dependent, we need to
estimate each user’s specific risk preferences. In particular,
we want to estimate the user’s value function parameters
λ and β in (2), which are problem-specific.20 For example,
the parameters in making financial investments and enjoying
entertainment may be quite different even for the same user.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code of our algorithm to
estimate the user’s value function parameters λ and β. The
basic idea is to solve the two indifference equations below
[18], [19] for λ and β in the value function in (2).
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v
(−pibind(dI −Qˆ) + L(dI − di))
=
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v (L(Qˆ − di)) , and (25)
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v (pi
s
ind(Qˆ − d1) + L(d1 − di))
=
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v (L(Qˆ − di)) . (26)
Here, pibind and pi
s
ind are the user’s indifference prices, where
pibind corresponds to the price below which he is willing buy
data at dmax − Qˆ, and pisind is the price above which he is
willing to sell data at Qˆ − dmin, where dmax and dmin are
defined in line 5.
In Appendix F, we establish that every pair of indifference
equations (25) and (26) of Algorithm 1 has a unique solution
of λ and β.
When estimating the indifference price, the user may not
have an exact value in mind. Hence, to improve the estimation
accuracy of Algorithm 1, we have an estimation period of
Tmˆ days (line 2 to 9), and have Tmˆ pairs of difference
equations with different demand predictions. Then, we choose
the average values among the solutions of the equations (line
10).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In Section VI-A, we first illustrate the impact of the PT
model parameters on the user’s optimal decision of a single
trading in the billing cycle. Then we evaluate the performance
of our algorithm by numerically simulating the case of making
multiple decisions in a billing cycle in Section VI-B.
20Here, we assume that the probability distortion parameter µ and the
reference point Rp are known. Note that probability distortion reflects the
user’s weighting effect on small and large probabilities, which does not depend
on a specific problem. Hence, we will assume that the user already knows his
probability distortion parameter µ through some other applications, surveys, or
his previous investment decisions, e.g., the surveys in [18], [19]. We can also
calculate parameter µ through some surveys related to lotteries. For example,
“Which Lottery do you prefer? A: 100% to win $2; B: 99% to win $0, and
1% to win $100”. However, there is very few literature on estimating user’s
reference point, because a varying reference point will make the indifference
equations in (25) and (26) complicated and unsolvable. In our paper, we have
shown the impact of Rp in our analysis on two different values in Section
IV. For simplicity, we assume the high reference point Rp = 0 in the app
design and simulations in Sections V and VI-B.
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The simulations illustrate the following insights for a PT
user’ optimal trading decision (by comparing with an EUT
user): (i) risk-seeking dominant under a high reference point:
Without considering the effect of probability distortion, a PT
buyer is risk-seeking and is less willing to buy mobile data
and more willing to sell mobile data than an EUT buyer.
(ii) Probability distortion: For the case of binary demand
realizations, when the probability of high demand is small,
a PT buyer is risk-averse and is more willing to buy mobile
data. On the other hand, when the probability of high demand
is large, a PT buyer is risk-seeking and is less willing to buy
mobile data. (iii) Profit: A PT user achieves a lower average
profit than an EUT user. However, a risk-seeking dominant
user can achieve a higher maximum profit, while a risk-averse
dominant user can guarantee a higher minimum profit.
A. Impact of PT Model Parameters
In this subsection, we illustrate the impact of the PT model
parameters (λ, β, and µ) and market parameters (pimins and
pimaxb ) on the user’s optimal decision with I = 20 possible
outcomes in Figs. 7, 8, and 9, and then illustrate the impact of
the demand uncertainty parameter (p) with binary outcomes
(I = 2) in Fig. 10. Due to space limitations, we will only
consider the high reference point Rp = 0 for the PT case.
Impact of the loss penalty parameter λ and the risk
parameter β on a buyer’s threshold price p¯iPThb : Here we
assume µ = 1 and p1 = p2 = . . . = p20 = 0.05. Fig. 7 shows
that the buyer threshold price p¯iPThb is increasing in β for a
fixed value of λ, and does not change in λ for a fixed value
of β. Note that a higher threshold price means that the buyer
is more willing to buy mobile data. This is because under
the high reference point Rp = 0, the buyer will consider any
possible outcome as a loss. In this case, a smaller β means
that the user is more risk-seeking in losses, so he does not
need to purchase mobile data to reduce the risk that the future
data demand exceeds the quota. Meanwhile, notice that λ is
used for differentiate the value function in the loss region and
gain region in (2). As the user will never encounter a gain in
this case, the threshold price is independent of λ.
Impact of the loss penalty parameter λ and the risk
parameter β on a seller’s optimal selling quantity q∗s : Fig. 8
illustrates how the seller’s selling quantity q∗s changes with
the maximum buying price pimaxb and λ. Here we assume that
p1 = p2 = . . . = p20 = 0.05, µ = 1, and β = 0.8. Fig. 8
shows that q∗s increases in pi
max
b . This is because as pi
max
b
increases, the seller gains more revenue from the trade, hence
he wants to sell more. Fig. 8 also shows that under the same
value of pimaxb , q
∗
s is non-increasing in λ. This is because, as λ
increases, the seller becomes more loss averse, hence he will
sell less in order to avoid a heavy loss when the future data
demand is high.
Fig. 9 illustrates how the seller’s selling quantity q∗s changes
with the maximum buying price pimaxb and β. Here we assume
that µ = 1 and λ = 2. Fig. 9 shows that q∗s is decreasing in
β under a small pimaxb , and is increasing in β under a large
pimaxb . This is because under the high reference point Rp = 0,
the seller will encounter either a small gain or a large loss.
In this case, a smaller β means that the user is more risk-
averse dominant, hence becomes more willing to sell mobile
data. However, when pimaxb is large, the seller will encounter
a large gain from selling data. In this case, a smaller β means
that the user is more risk-seeking dominant, hence becomes
less willing to sell mobile data.
Impact of the probability distortion parameter µ on
a buyer’s threshold price p¯iPThb in (10): To illustrate the
impact of the probability distortion parameter, we assume
binary outcomes with I = 2. Fig. 10 considers three differ-
ent probabilities of high demand: high (p = 0.8), medium
(p = 0.5), and low (p = 0.2). Here we assume β = 0.8 and
λ = 2. We can see that p¯iPThb decreases in µ when p = 0.2,
is independent of µ when p = 0.5, and increases in µ when
p = 0.8. As a smaller µ means that the buyer will overweigh
the low probability more, he becomes more risk-averse (i.e.,
p¯iPThb decreases) when p is small. Similarly, since a smaller
µ means that the buyer will underweigh the high probability
more, he is more risk-seeking (i.e., p¯iPThb increases) when the
p is large.
B. Evaluation of The Mobile Data Trading Algorithm
We then evaluate the total profit generated by our algo-
rithm’s trading decisions (introduced in Section V) in a billing
cycle. For each simulation, we consider a billing cycle of
T = 30 time slots. In the simulation settings, we assume
that across two consecutive time slots, the prices pimaxb and
pimins increase by one unit (i.e., dollar) with probability pc,
decrease by one unit with probability pc, or remain unchanged
with probability 1 − 2pc. The changes of pimaxb and pimins
are independent. We set the monthly quota Qˆ = 2 GB, and
randomly generate the previous I months’ total demand di
(defined in (23)) with a mean value of 2 GB21. The algorithm
calculates the trading decision in every time slot based on the
user’s risk preferences under the high reference point Rp = 0.
Specifically, we define the profit22 Pmˆ of month mˆ as
Pmˆ =
Tmˆ∑
ˆ=1
−q∗ˆ piˆ − L(Q+
Tmˆ∑
ˆ=1
q∗ˆ −
Tmˆ∑
ˆ=1
dmˆ,ˆ), (27)
which consists of two parts: the net revenue due to selling or
buying data, and the payment due to satisfaction loss. In (27),
a positive q∗ˆ means that the user buys data quota in day ˆ,
while a negative q∗ˆ means that the user sells data quota in
day ˆ.
By repeatedly running the simulation for 1000 billing cycles
with randomly generated demands and prices, we first eval-
uate the impact of risk preferences on the maximum profit,
minimum profit, and the average profit. We then compare
the average profit achieved by the algorithm implemented by
our mobile app and several other benchmark strategies under
different price variations with different price variations. In the
first benchmark strategy “trade with certainty”, we assume
21In our simulation, we generate both uniformly distributed and normally
distributed (with standard deviation 1/3) demands.
22The profit may be negative, meaning that the total revenue due to selling
data is lower than the payment due to buying data plus the payment due to
satisfaction loss.
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that the user is not willing to trade when he has uncertainty.
This means that he will only trade once near the end of his
billing cycle, when he knows the exact value of his monthly
usage. In the second benchmark strategy “no data trading”,
the user does not trade at all. We compare these three strategies
under the uniformly distributed usage.
In Fig. 11, we assume pc = 0.1, and plot the profit of
the user with different risk preferences. The risk parameters
of different users are: (a) risk-averse dominant user: β = 1,
λ = 2; (b) risk-neutral user (EUT user): β = λ = 1; (c)
risk-seeking dominant user: β = 0.8, λ = 1.23 Since an
EUT operator makes decision only by maximizing expected
profit, we can see from Fig. 11 that he can achieve the
highest average profit. On the other hand, a PT operator makes
decision by taking into account both the expected profit and its
risk preferences. More specifically, although both risk-seeking
dominant and risk-averse dominant PT users achieve a lower
expected profit comparing to an EUT user, the risk-seeking
dominant user can earn a higher maximum possible profit,
while the risk-averse dominant user can guarantee a higher
minimum possible profit. This is because the risk-seeking
dominant user trades more quota, hence earns more when
the price change is profitable, and loses more when the price
change is unprofitable.
In Fig. 12, we plot the profit of the risk-neutral user with
different values of the price variation probability pc under
the uniformly distributed usage. Fig. 12 shows that the gap
23 A larger λ indicates that the user is more loss averse, hence is more
risk-averse. Since we have assumed a high reference point Rp = 0, a smaller
β means the user is more risk-seeking dominant.
between the profits generated by “our mobile app” and the
“trade with certainty” strategies increases with pc, e.g., the
gap at pc = 0.4 is 500% larger than the gap at pc = 0.1. This
is because our mobile app suggests users buy when the price
is low and sell when the price is high, hence takes advantage
of the price variation. Comparing with the “no data trading”
strategy, the user significantly benefits from the data trading
market (i.e., reduces his net payment by 50%).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered a mobile data trading
market that is motivated by the CMHK’s 2CM platform.
We have analyzed the optimal trading decision of a single
user under a large market regime. We have compared and
contrasted the user’s optimal decisions under prospect theory
(PT) and expected utility theory (EUT), and have highlighted
several key insights. Comparing with an EUT user, a PT user
with a high reference point is less willing to buy mobile data
and more willing to sell mobile data. Moreover, when the
probability of high demand is low, a PT user is more willing
to buy mobile data comparing with an EUT user. On the
other hand, when the probability of high demand is high, a
PT user is less willing to buy mobile data. In addition, we
have designed a mobile data trading algorithm to recommend
multiple trading decisions based on the user’s current usage
and risk preferences. Our results suggested that a risk averse
dominant user can achieve the highest minimum profit, a
risk-seeking dominant user can achieve the highest maximum
profit, while a risk-neutral user can achieve the highest average
profit.
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This study demonstrated that a more realistic behavioral
modeling based on PT can shed important insights in un-
derstanding user’s behavior on mobile data trading. In the
future work, we will use our app to collect data from the
real market to help us understand users’ real behaviors in data
trading, and study the trading decision equilibria among all
the market users and consider the service provider’s data plan
optimization. It is also interesting to study how the market
competition among the service providers and the user-initiated
data plan trading (such as that proposed in [36]) affect the
users’ decisions, and how the data trading market affect the
operator’s other data plans (e.g., shared data plan).
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We divide the feasible interval of buying quantity qb into I−
ıˆ+1 sub-intervals, [0, dıˆ+1−Q], . . . , [dI−Q,∞), and analyze
the optimal buying quantity q∗b that maximizes U(b, qb) within
each sub-interval. Such a division is based on (1) that L(Q+
qb − di) = 0 when qb ≥ di −Q.
1) Buyer’s Problem in (5) Under PT with Rp = 0:
Case I: qb ∈ [dj−1 − Q, dj − Q], j = ıˆ + 1, . . . , I . In
this case, the satisfaction loss under low demands is L(Q +
qb − di) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , j − 1, and the satisfaction loss
under high demands is L(Q+ qb − di) = κ(Q+ qb − di) for
i = j, . . . , I . Thus, from (2) and (5), we obtain
U(b, qb) =
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)v[−piqb]
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)v[κ(Q− di)− piqb + κqb]
=− λ
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)(piqb)
β
− λ
I∑
i=j
w(pi)[(pi − κ)qb + κ(di −Q)]β . (28)
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The second order partial derivative of U(b, qb) with respect
to qb is
∂U2(qb)
∂q2b
= −
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)(β − 1)λβpiβqβ−2b
−
I∑
i=j
w(pi)(pi − κ)2λβ(β − 1)[(pi − κ)qb + κ(di −Q)]β−2
> 0, (29)
which implies that U(b, qb) is a convex function in qb, and
the optimal solution must lie at one of the boundary points.
Hence, q∗b = arg maxqb∈{di−Q,i=j−1,j}{U(b, qb)}.
Case II: qb ∈ [0, dıˆ+1 − Q]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demands is L(Q+ qb − di) = 0 for i < ıˆ, and
the satisfaction loss under high demands is L(Q+ qb − di) =
κ(Q+ qb − di) for i ≥ ıˆ. Thus, from (2) and (5), we obtain
U(b, qb) =
ıˆ−1∑
i=1
w(pi)v(−piqb)
+
I∑
i=ıˆ
v[−piqb + L(Q− di + qb)]. (30)
Similar to Case I, we can show that U(b, qb) is a convex
function in qb, and the optimal solution must lie at one
of the boundary points. Hence, we can obtain that q∗b =
arg maxqb∈{0,dıˆ+1−Q}{U(b, qb)}.
Case III: qb ∈ [dI − Q,∞]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss is L(Q + qb − di) = 0. Thus, the expected utility from
(5) is decreasing in qb, and the optimal qb in this range is
q∗b = dI −Q.
Combining the analysis in Cases I, and III, we have q∗b =
arg maxqb∈{Q−di,i=ıˆ+1,...,I}∪{0}{U(b, qb)}.
2) Buyer’s Problem in (5) Under PT with Rp = κ(Q − dI):
Case I: qb ∈ [dj−1−Q, dj−Q], j = ıˆ+1, . . . , I . In this case,
the satisfaction loss under low demands is L(Q+ qb − di) =
0 for i = 1, . . . , j − 1, and the satisfaction loss under high
demands is L(Q+ qb−dl) = κ(Q+ qb−dj) for i = j, . . . , I .
Thus, from (2) and (5), we obtain
U(b, qb) =
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)V [−piqb − κ(Q− dI)]
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)V [κ(Q− di)− piqb + κqb − κ(Q− dI)]
=
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)[−piqb + κ(dI −Q)]β
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)[(κ− pi)qb + κ(dI − di)]β . (31)
The second order partial derivative of U(b, qb) with respect
to qb is
∂U2(qb)
∂q2b
=
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)(−pi)2(β − 1)β[κ(dI −Q)− piqb]β−2
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)(κ− pi)2(β − 1)β[(κ− pi)qb + κ(dI − di)]β−2
< 0, (32)
which implies that U(b, qb) is a concave function in qb, and the
optimal solution must lie at a critical point where U ′(b, qb) =
0 (if such a point exists in the sub-interval) or one of the
boundary points (if a critical point does not exist in the sub-
interval). Hence, q∗b = arg maxqb∈{Q−di,i∈I}∪Xb{U(b, qb)}.
Case II: qb ∈ [0, dıˆ −Q]. In this case, the satisfaction loss
under low demands is L(Q + qb − di) = 0 for i < ıˆ, and
the satisfaction loss under high demands is L(Q+ qb − dl) =
κ(Q+ qb − di) for i ≥ ıˆ. Thus, from (5) and (2), we obtain
U(b, qb) =
ıˆ−1∑
i=1
w(pi)V [−piqb − κ(Q− dI)]
+
I∑
i=ıˆ
w(pi)V [κ(Q− di)− piqb + κqb − κ(Q− dI)]. (33)
Similar to Case I, we know that U(b, qb) is a concave func-
tion in qb, which implies that U(b, qb) is a concave function in
qb, and the optimal solution must lie at a critical point where
U ′(b, qb) = 0 (if such a point exists in the sub-interval) or one
of the boundary points (if a critical point does not exist in the
sub-interval). Hence, q∗b = arg maxqb∈{0,dıˆ−Q}∪Xb{U(b, qb)}.
Case III: qb ∈ [dI − Q,∞]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss is L(Q + qb − di) = 0. Thus, the expected utility from
(5) is decreasing in qb, and the optimal qb in this range is
q∗b = dI −Q.
Combining the analysis in Case I, Case II, and Case III, we
can obtain that q∗b = arg maxqb∈{Q−di,i∈I}∪Xb{U(b, qb)}.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
For all three cases, we divide the feasible interval of buying
quantity qb into two sub-intervals, [0, dh−Q] and [dh−Q,∞),
and analyze the optimal buying quantity q∗b that maximizes
U(b, qb) within each sub-interval. Such a division is due to
the fact that the satisfaction loss L(Q + qb − dh) = 0 when
qb ∈ [dh −Q,∞).
1) Buyer’s Problem Under EUT:
• Case I: qb ∈ [0, dh − Q]. In this case, from (1), the
satisfaction loss under low demand is L(Q+qb−dl) = 0,
and the satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q+qb−
dh) = κ(Q+ qb − dh). The expected utility from (5) is
U(b, qb) = (κp− pimins )qb + κp(Q− dh), (34)
which is a linear function in qb. It is increasing in qb
when pimins < κp, and decreasing in qb when pi
min
s >
κp. The optimal buying quantity is then q∗b = dh − Q
when pimins < κp, and q
∗
b = 0 when pi
min
s > κp. When
pimins = κp, the utility is independent of qb. Without loss
of generality, we assume that q∗b = 0 when pi
min
s = κp.
14
• Case II: qb ∈ [dh − Q,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
loss under both low demand and high demand equals to
0, and the utility U(b, qb) = −pimins qb. Since the utility
function U(b, qb) is linearly decreasing in qb, we have
q∗b = dh −Q in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (11).
2) Buyer’s Problem Under PT with Rp = 0 :
• Case I: qb ∈ [0, dh − Q]. In this case, from (1), the
satisfaction loss under low demand is L(Q+qb−dl) = 0,
and the satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q+qb−
dh) = κ(Q+ qb − dh). The expected utility from (5) is
U(b, qb) =− λ(pimins qb − κ(Q+ qb − dh))βw(p)
− λ(pimins qb)βw(1− p). (35)
The second order partial derivative of U(b, qb) with
respect to qb is
∂U2(b, qb)
∂2qb
= −λβ(β − 1)
[
(pimins )
β(qb)
βw(1− p)
+ (pimins − κ)2[(pimins − κ)qb − κ(Q− dh)]β−2w(p)
]
> 0, (36)
which implies that U(b, qb) is a convex function in qb,
and the optimal solution must lie at one of the boundary
points.24 Hence q∗b = dh −Q if U(b, 0) < U(b, dh −Q),
and q∗b = 0 if U(b, 0) ≥ U(b, dh −Q).
• Case II: qb ∈ [dh − Q,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
loss under both low demand and high demand equals to
0, and the expected utility is
U(b, qb) = −λ[w(p) + w(1− p)](pimins qb)β . (37)
Since the first order partial derivative ∂U(b, qb)/∂qb < 0,
U(b, qb) is a decreasing function of qb, and q∗b = dh−Q
in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (12).
3) Buyer’s Problem Under PT with Rp = κ(Q− dh):
• Case I: qb ∈ [0, dh−Q]. In this case, the satisfaction loss
under low demand is L(Q+ qb−dl) = 0, and that under
high demand is L(Q+ qb − dh) = κ(Q+ qb − dh). The
expected utility is
U(b, qb) =− λ(pimins qb + κ(dh −Q))βw(1− p)
− λ((κ− pimins )qb)βw(p). (38)
The second order partial derivative of U(b, qb) with
respect to qb is
∂U2(b, qb)
∂2qb
= β(β − 1){w(p)(κ− pimins )βqβ−2b
+ w(1− p)(pimins )2[κ(dh −Q)− pimins qb]β−2}
< 0, (39)
so U(b, qb) is a strictly concave function of qb. As a result,
the optimal solution q∗b satisfies the first order condition
or lies at one of the boundary points.
24In the case β = 1 and U(b, 0) = U(b, dh−Q), we will choose q∗b = 0
without loss of generality.
We consider the first order partial derivative of U(b, qb)
with respect to qb:
∂U(b, qb)
∂qb
= β{w(p)(κ− pimins )βqβ−1b
+ w(1− p)(pimins )[κ(dh −Q)− pimins qb]β−1}. (40)
– If β = 1, ∂U(b, qb)/∂qb is independent of qb.
When pimins <
κw(p)
w(p)+w(1−p) , ∂U(b, qb)/∂qb > 0,
so q∗b = dh − Q. When pimins ≥ κw(p)w(p)+w(1−p) ,
∂U(b, qb)/∂qb ≤ 0, so q∗b = 0.
– If 0 < β < 1, solving ∂U(b, qb)/∂qb = 0, we have
q˜b =
κ(Q−dh)[
w(p)(κ−pimins )β
w(1−p)pimins
] 1
β−1
+pimins
> 0. If q˜b < dh −Q,
then the optimal solution q∗b = q˜b. Otherwise, q
∗
b =
dh −Q.
• Case II: qb ∈ [dh − Q,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
losses under both low demand and high demand equal to
0, and the expected utility is
U(b, qb) = −λ[w(p) + w(1− p)](pimins qb + κ(dh −Q))β .
(41)
Since the first order partial derivative ∂U(b, qb)/∂qb < 0,
the utility function U(b, qb) is a decreasing function of
qb, so q∗b = dh −Q in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (13).
C. Proof of Theorem 3
In the proof, we divide the feasible interval of selling
quantity qs into ıˆ + 1 sub-intervals, [0, Q − dıˆ], . . . , [Q −
d2, Q − d1], [Q − d1,∞), and analyze the optimal buying
quantity q∗s that maximizes U(b, qs) within each sub-interval.
Such a division is based on the fact that the satisfaction loss
L(Q+ qs − di) = 0 when qs ≥ di −Q.
1) Seller’s Problem in (6) Under PT with Rp = 0:
Case I: qs ∈ [Q− dj , Q− dj−1], j = 2, . . . , ıˆ. In this case,
the satisfaction loss under low demands is L(Q−qs−di) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , j, and the satisfaction loss under high demands
is L(Q− qs− di) = κ(Q− qs− di) for i = j + 1, . . . , I . The
expected utility from (6) is
U(s, qs) =
I∑
i=1
w(pi)v[piqs + L(Q− qs − di)]
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)v[piqs] +
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)(piqs)
β
+
ıˆ∑
i=j+1
w(pi)v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]
−
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)(λ)[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β . (42)
Since the sign of function v[(pi−κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] depends
on the value of qs, Q − dj , Q − dj−1, κ(Q−dj+1)κ−pi , κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi ,
we divide the discussion in the following six cases:
(a) κ(Q−dj+1)k−pi < Q−dj . In this case, qs ∈ (κ(Q−dj+1)κ−pi , Q−
dj−1], and we have v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q − di)] < 0, ∀i =
15
j + 1, . . . , ıˆ. The first order derivative
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
−
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)λ(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(p1)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1−
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
λβ(
k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
− 1 + k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1]
, (43)
where
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(−λ)β(k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
− 1 + k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1
is increasing in qs. This indicates that the equation U ′(s, qs) =
0 has at most one solution qs. Hence, we can find that the
optimal q∗s is the solution of U
′(s, qs) = 0, or at one of the
boundary points κ(Q− dj+1)/(κ− pi) or Q− dj−1.
(b) κ(Q−dıˆ)k−pi < Q − dj < κ(Q−dj+1)k−pi < Q − dj−1. In this
case, without loss of generality, we assume
κ(Q−d ˆm+1)
k−pi < Q−
dj <
κ(Q−dmˆ)
k−pi . When qs ∈ [κ(Q−dm+1)κ−pi , κ(Q−dm)κ−pi ],m = j +
1, . . . , mˆ, we have v[(pi−κ)qs +κ(Q− di)] ≤ 0 for i = m+
1, . . . , ıˆ, and v[(pi−κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] ≥ 0 for i = j+1, . . . ,m.
From (42), we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)β(pi − κ)[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)β(κ− pi)λ[(κ− pi)qs − κ(Q− di)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)
j∑
i=1
w(pi)
(1− κ
pi
)
[
1− κ
pi
+
κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)
j∑
i=1
w(pi)
(
κ
pi
− 1)λ
[
κ
pi
− 1− κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1 ]
,
(44)
which follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that the
optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries
κ(Q−dm+1)
κ−pi or
κ(Q−dm)
κ−pi . When qs ∈ (κ(Q−dj+1)κ−pi , Q− dj−1], we have v[(pi−
κ)qs + κ(Q − di)] < 0, ∀i = j + 1, . . . , ıˆ. The first order
derivative
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
−
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)λ(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(p1)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
−
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
λβ(
k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
− 1 + k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1
+ 1
]
, (45)
where
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(−λ)β(k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
− 1 + k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1
is increasing in qs. This indicates that the equation U ′(s, qs) =
0 has at most one solution qs. Hence, we can find that the
optimal q∗s is the solution of U
′(s, qs) = 0, or at one of the
boundary points κ(Q− dj+1)/(κ− pi) or Q− dj−1.
(c) Q − dj < κ(Q−dıˆ)k−pi < Q − dj−1 < κ(Q−dj+1)k−pi . In this
case, without loss of generality, we assume
κ(Q−d ˆm+1)
k−pi < Q−
dj−1 <
κ(Q−dmˆ)
k−pi . When qs ∈ [Q − dj , κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi ), we have
v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)] > 0, ∀i = j + 1, . . . , ıˆ. From (42),
we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
(−λ)(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1, (46)
which also follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that
the optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries Q−dj or κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi .
When qs ∈ [κ(Q−dm+1)κ−pi , κ(Q−dm)κ−pi ],m = mˆ+ 1, . . . , ˆı− 1, we
have v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)] ≤ 0 for i = m+ 1, . . . , ıˆ, and
v[(pi−κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] ≥ 0 for i = j+1, . . . ,m. From (42),
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we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)β(pi − κ)[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)β(κ− pi)λ[(κ− pi)qs − κ(Q− di)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1 +
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(1
− κ
pi
)
[
1− κ
pi
+
κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)
j∑
i=1
w(pi)
(
κ
pi
− 1)λ
[
κ
pi
− 1− κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1 ]
,
(47)
which follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that the
optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries
κ(Q−dm+1)
κ−pi or
κ(Q−dm)
κ−pi .
(d) Q − dj < κ(Q−dıˆ)k−pi < κ(Q−dj+1)k−pi < Q − dj−1. When
qs ∈ (κ(Q−dj+1)κ−pi , Q − dj−1], we have v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q −
di)] < 0, ∀i = j + 1, . . . , ıˆ. The first order derivative
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
−
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)λ(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(p1)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1−
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
λβ(
k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
1 +
k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1 ]
,
where
I∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(−λ)β(k
pi
− 1)
[
k
pi
− 1 + k(di −Q)
piqs
]β−1
is increasing in qs. This indicates that the equation U ′(s, qs) =
0 has at most one solution qs. Hence, we can find that the
optimal q∗s is the solution of U
′(s, qs) = 0, or at one of the
boundary points κ(Q − dj+1)/(κ − pi) or Q − dj−1. When
qs ∈ [κ(Q−dm+1)κ−pi , κ(Q−dm)κ−pi ],m = j + 1, . . . , ıˆ − 1, we have
v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q − di)] ≤ 0 for i = m + 1, . . . , ıˆ, and
v[(pi−κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] ≥ 0 for i = j+1, . . . ,m. From (42),
we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)β(pi − κ)[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)β(κ− pi)λ[(κ− pi)qs − κ(Q− di)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(1− κ
pi
)
[
1− κ
pi
+
κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1
+
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(
κ
pi
− 1)(−λ)
[
κ
pi
− 1− κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1]
, (48)
which follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that the
optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries
κ(Q−dm+1)
κ−pi or
κ(Q−dm)
κ−pi . When qs ∈ [Q − dj , κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi ), we have v[(pi −
κ)qs + κ(Q − di)] > 0, ∀i = j + 1, . . . , ıˆ. From (42), we
obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
(−λ)(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1, (49)
which also follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that
the optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries Q−dj or κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi .
(e) κ(Q−dıˆ)k−pi < Q−dj < Q−dj−1 < κ(Q−dj+1)k−pi . In this case,
without loss of generality, we assume
κ(Q−d ˆm+1)
k−pi < Q−dj <
κ(Q−dmˆ)
k−pi , and
κ(Q−d ˆl+1)
k−pi < Q − dj <
κ(Q−dlˆ)
k−pi . When qs ∈
[κ(Q−dm+1)κ−pi ,
κ(Q−dm)
κ−pi ],m = ˆm+ 1, . . . , lˆ, we have v[(pi −
κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] ≤ 0 for i = m+1, . . . , ıˆ, and v[(pi−κ)qs+
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κ(Q− di)] ≥ 0 for i = j + 1, . . . ,m. From (42), we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)β(pi − κ)[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)β(κ− pi)λ[(κ− pi)qs − κ(Q− di)]β−1
=
j∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
[
1
+
m∑
i=j+1
w(pi)∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(1− κ
pi
)
[
1− κ
pi
+
κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1
−
I∑
i=m+1
w(pi)λ∑j
i=1 w(pi)
(
κ
pi
− 1)
[
κ
pi
− 1− κ(Q− di)
piqs
]β−1 ]
,
(50)
which follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that the
optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries
κ(Q−dm+1)
κ−pi or
κ(Q−dm)
κ−pi .
(f) κ(Q−dıˆ)k−pi > Q−dj−1. In this case, qs ∈ [Q−dj , κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi ),
and we have v[(pi−κ)qs+κ(Q−di)] > 0, ∀i = j+ 1, . . . , ıˆ.
From (42), we obtain
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)pi
ββqβ−1s
+
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
(−λ)(κ− pi)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β−1, (51)
which also follows a unimodal structure, and we can find that
the optimal q∗s must lie at the critical point (i.e., the solution of
U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries Q−dj or κ(Q−dıˆ)κ−pi .
Hence, combining the above six cases, we have the optimal
selling quantity
q∗s = arg max
qs∈{Q−di,i=1,...,ˆı}∪Xsh
{U(s, qs)}.
Case II: qs ∈ [Q−d1,∞). In this case, the expected utility
from (6) is decreasing in qs, hence the optimal qs in this range
is q∗s = Q− d1.
Case III: qs ∈ [0, Q− dıˆ]. In this case, the satisfaction loss
under low demands is L(Q−qs−di) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , ıˆ, and
the satisfaction loss under high demands is L(Q− qs− di) =
κ(Q− qs− di) for i = ıˆ+ 1, . . . , I . The expected utility from
(6) is
U(s, qs) =
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)v[piqs]
+
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)v[(pi − κ)qs + κ(Q− di)]
=
ıˆ∑
i=1
w(pi)(piqs)
β
−
I∑
i=ıˆ+1
w(pi)λ[(κ− pi)qs + κ(di −Q)]β . (52)
The first order derivative ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs follows a unimodal
structure, and we can find that q∗s must lie at the critical point
(i.e., the solution of U ′(s, qs) = 0), or at one of the boundaries
0 or Q− dıˆ.
Combining the analysis in Cases I, II, and III, we have
q∗s = arg maxqs∈{Q−di,i=1,...,ˆı}∪Xsh∪{0}{U(s, qs)}.
2) Seller’s Problem in (6) Under PT with Rp = κ(Q − dI):
Case I: qs ∈ [Q−dj , Q−dj−1], j = 2, . . . , ıˆ. In this case, the
satisfaction loss under low demands is L(Q+qs−di) = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , j−1, and the satisfaction loss under high demands
is L(Q + qs − dl) = κ(Q + qs − dj) for i = j, . . . , I . The
expected utility from (6) is
U(s, qs) =
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)V [−piqs − κ(Q− dI)]
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)V [κ(Q− di)− piqs + κqs − κ(Q− dI)]
=
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)[−piqs + κ(dI −Q)]β
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)[(κ− pi)qs + κ(dI − di)]β . (53)
The second order partial derivative of U(s, qs) with respect
to qs is
∂U2(qs)
∂q2s
=
j−1∑
i=1
w(pi)(−pi)2(β − 1)β[κ(dI −Q)− piqs]β−2
+
I∑
i=j
w(pi)(κ− pi)2(β − 1)β[(κ− pi)qs + κ(dI − di)]β−2
< 0, (54)
which implies that U(s, qs) is a concave function in qs, and
the optimal solution must lie at the critical point, where
U ′(s, qs) = 0, or one of the boundary points.
Hence, q∗s = arg maxqs∈{Q−di,i∈I}∪Xsl{U(s, qs)}.
Case II: qs ∈ [Q−d1,∞). In this case, the expected utility
from (6) is decreasing in qs, hence the optimal qs in this range
is q∗s = Q− d1.
Case III: qs ∈ [0, Q− dıˆ]. In this case, the satisfaction loss
under low demands is L(Q + qs − di) = 0 for i < ıˆ, and
the satisfaction loss under high demands is L(Q+ qs − dl) =
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κ(Q+ qs − di) for i ≥ ıˆ. The expected utility from (6) is
U(s, qs) =
ˆı−1∑
i=1
w(pi)V [−piqs − κ(Q− dI)]
+
I∑
i=ıˆ
w(pi)V [κ(Q− di)− piqs + κqs − κ(Q− dI)]. (55)
Similar to Case I, we know that U(s, qs) is a concave
function in qs, and the optimal solution must lie at the critical
point, where U ′(s, qs) = 0, or one of the boundary points.
Hence, q∗s = arg maxqs∈{0,Q−dıˆ}∪Xsh∪{0}{U(s, qs)}.
Combining the analysis in Case I, Case II, and Case III, we
have
q∗s = arg maxqs∈{Q−di,i∈I}∪Xsh∪{0}{U(s, qs)}.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
In the proof of all three cases, we divide the feasible set of
selling quantity qs into two subsets, [0, Q−dl] and [Q−dl,∞),
and analyze the optimal selling quantity q∗s that maximizes
U(s, qs) within each subset. Such a division is due to the fact
that the satisfaction loss L(Q − qs − dl) = κ(Q − qs − dl)
when qs ∈ [Q− dl,∞) which simplifies our analysis.
1) Seller’s Problem under EUT:
• Case I: qs ∈ [0, Q − dl]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q − qs − dl) = 0, and the
satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q− qs−dh) =
κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) = (pi
max
b − κp)qs + κp(Q− dh), (56)
which is a linear function in qs, hence increasing in qs
when pimaxb > κp and decreasing in qs, when pi
max
b <
κp. The optimal selling quantity is then q∗s = Q − dl
when pimaxb > κp and q
∗
s = 0 when pi
max
b < κp. When
pimaxb = κp, the utility is independent of qs. Without loss
of generality, we assume that q∗s = 0 when pi
max
b = κp.
• Case II: qs ∈ [Q − dl,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q−qs−dl) = κ(Q−qs−dl),
and the satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q−qs−
dh) = κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) = (pi
max
b − κ)qs + κQ− κdhp− κdl(1− p).
(57)
Since the utility function U(s, qs) is linearly decreasing
in qs, we have q∗s = Q− dl in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (20).
2) Seller’s Problem under PT with Rp = 0:
• Case I: qs ∈ [0, Q − dl]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q − qs − dl) = 0, and the
satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q− qs−dh) =
κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) =− λ((κ− pimaxb )qs + κ(dh −Q))βw(p)
+ (pimaxb qs)
βw(1− p). (58)
Proposition 1. There is at most one local maximum
point of U(s, qs) in the case qs ∈ [0, dh − Q]. When
1 >
λ(κ−pimaxb )βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1−p) (1 +
κ(Q−dh)
(κ−pimaxb )(Q−dl) )
β−1, the local
maximum point is at the right boundary point qs = dh−
Q. When 1 ≤ λ(κ−pimaxb )βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1−p) (1 +
κ(Q−dh)
(κ−pimaxb )(Q−dl) )
β−1,
the local maximum point is at an interior point qs =
κ
κ−pimax
b
(Q−dh)
(
w(1−p)pimax
b
β
w(p)λ(κ−pimax
b
)β
)
1
β−1−1
.
Proof: The first order partial derivative of U(s, qs)
with respect to qs is
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
= β(pimaxb qs)
β−1pimaxb w(1− p)
− λβ(κ− pimaxb )((κ− pimaxb )qs + κ(dh −Q))β−1w(p).
(59)
We define
g(qs) = 1− w(p)λ(κ− pi
max
b )
β
w(1− p)pimaxb β
(1 +
κ(Q− dh)
qs
)β−1,
(60)
and we can rewrite
∂U(s, qs)/∂qs = w(1− p)pimaxb βqβ−1s βg(qs),
where w(1− p)pimaxb βqβ−1s β > 0. The function g(qs) is
a strictly decreasing function of qs, which means the first
order partial derivative ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs will only be zero
at most once, thus at most one local maximum point.
We then consider the two boundary points: qs =  and
qs = Q − dl − , with  being a small positive number
approaching zero (i.e. → 0+).
1) When qs = , we have
lim
→0+
g() = lim
→0+
1
− w(p)λ(κ− pi
max
b )
β
w(1− p)pimaxb β
(1 +
κ(Q− dl)

)β−1
=∞. (61)
2) When qs = Q− dl − , we have:
lim
→0+
g() = lim
→0+
1
− w(p)λ(κ− pi
max
b )
β
w(1− p)pimaxb β
(1 +
κ(Q− dl)
Q− dl −  )
β−1.
(62)
We can obtain
lim
→0+
g(Q− dl − ) > 0
⇔ 1 > λ(κ− pi
max
b )
βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1− p) (1
+
κ(Q− dh)
(κ− pimaxb )(Q− dl)
)β−1. (63)
Since g(qs) and ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs have the same sign, from
(63) we can obtain that
∂U(s,Q− dl − )/∂qs ≥ 0
19
when
1 ≤ λ(κ− pi
max
b )
βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1− p) (1 +
κ(Q− dh)
(κ− pimaxb )(Q− dl)
)β−1,
and
∂U(s,Q− dl − )/∂qs < 0
when
1 >
λ(κ− pimaxb )βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1− p) (1 +
κ(Q− dh)
(κ− pimaxb )(Q− dl)
)β−1.
For the same reason, from (61) we can obtain that
∂U(s, )/∂qs > 0.
Thus ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs may be all positive within the inter-
val [0, Q − dl] or first positive then negative within that
interval based on the value of pimaxb , µ, β and λ.
To sum up, the optimal selling amount q∗s in the case
qs ∈ [0, Q − dl] depends on the value of pimaxb , µ, β
and λ as follows. (i) When 1 ≤ λ(κ−pimaxb )βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1−p) (1 +
κ(Q−dh)
(κ−pimaxb )(Q−dl) )
β−1, the local maximum point is at an
interior point q∗s =
κ
κ−pimax
b
(Q−dh)
(
w(1−p)pimax
b
β
w(p)λ(κ−pimax
b
)β
)
1
β−1−1
. (ii) When
1 >
λ(κ−pimaxb )βw(p)
pimaxb
βw(1−p) (1 +
κ(Q−dh)
(κ−pimaxb )(Q−dl) )
β−1, the local
maximum point is at the right boundary q∗s = Q− dl.
• Case II: qs ∈ [Q − dl,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q−qs−dl) = κ(Q−qs−dl),
and the satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q−qs−
dh) = κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) =− λ((κ− pimaxb )qs + κ(dh −Q))βw(p)
− λ((κ− pimaxb )qs + κ(dl −Q))βw(1− p).
(64)
Since the first order partial derivative ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs < 0,
U(s, qs) is a decreasing function of qs, and q∗s = Q− dl
in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (21).
3) Seller’s Problem under PT with Rp = κ(Q− dh):
• Case I: qs ∈ [0, Q − dl]. In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q − qs − dl) = 0, and the
satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q− qs−dh) =
κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) =− λ((κ− pimaxb )qs)βw(p)
+ (pimaxb qs + κ(dh −Q))βw(1− p). (65)
Proposition 2. The maximum point of U(s, qs) in the
case qs ∈ [0, Q− dl] lies at one of the boundary points.
When U(s, 0) ≥ U(s,Q−dl), the maximum point is at the
left boundary point q∗s = 0. When U(s, 0) < U(s,Q−dl),
the maximum point is at the right boundary point q∗s =
Q− dl.
Proof: The first order partial derivative of U(s, qs)
with respect to qs is
∂U(s, qs)
∂qs
= −λβ(κ− pimaxb )βqβ−1s w(p)
+ βpimaxb [pi
max
b qs + κ(dh −Q)]β−1w(1− p). (66)
We define
g(qs) =
w(1− p)pimaxb
λw(p)
[
pimaxb
κ− pimaxb
+
κ(dh −Q)
(κ− pimaxb )qs
]β−1
− 1, (67)
and we can rewrite
∂U(s, qs)/∂qs = λβ(κ− pimaxb )βqβ−1s w(p)g(qs),
where
λβ(κ− pimaxb )βqβ−1s w(p) > 0.
The function g(qs) is a strictly increasing function
of qs, which means the first order partial derivative
∂U(s, qs)/∂qs will only be zero at most once, and the
point that satisfies the first order condition is a local
minimum point. Hence the maximum point of U(s, qs) in
the case qs ∈ [0, Q−dl] lies at one of the boundary points.
We compare the corresponding U(s, qs) with qs = 0 and
qs = Q− dl to find the optimal solution in this case.
To sum up, the optimal selling amount q∗s in the case
qs ∈ [0, Q− dl] depends on the value of pimaxb , µ, β and
λ as follows. (i) When λw(p)[(κ − pimaxb )(Q − dl)]β ≥
w(1−p){[(pimaxb −κ)Q+κdh−pimaxb dl]β−[κ(dh−Q)]β},
the local maximum point is at the left boundary point
qs = 0. (ii) When λw(p)[(κ−pimaxb )(Q− dl)]β < w(1−
p){[(pimaxb − κ)Q + κdh − pimaxb dl]β − [κ(dh − Q)]β},
the local maximum point is at the right boundary point
qs = Q− dl.
• Case II: qs ∈ [Q − dl,∞). In this case, the satisfaction
loss under low demand is L(Q−qs−dl) = κ(Q−qs−dl),
and the satisfaction loss under high demand is L(Q−qs−
dh) = κ(Q− qs − dh). The expected utility is
U(s, qs) = −λ((κ− pimaxb )qs)βw(p)
− λ((κ− pimaxb )qs + κ(dh − dl − 2Q))βw(1− p).
(68)
Since the first order partial derivative ∂U(s, qs)/∂qs < 0,
the utility function U(s, qs) is a decreasing function of
qs, and q∗s = Q− dl in this case.
Combing the above analysis, we obtain (22).
E. Detailed Dynamic Data Trading Algorithm
Next, we present an algorithm for computing the dynamic
data trading decisions starting at day ˆ. At the beginning of
each day, the user obtains the demand prediction according
to our sliding window method, and the remaining quota since
yesterday’s trade. The pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Dynamic Trading Decision
1 Input: Remaining quota (Qˆ), risk parameters (µ, β, λ,
Rp), demand prediction (di, pi, ∀i ∈ I), market
information (pimins , pi
max
b ).
2 // Initialize the risk parameters and personal profiles.
3 for j = J to T do
4 for i = 1 to I do
5 di := di−1 − δmˆ−i,j−1; // Update the prediction
of demand based on current usage.
6 Calculate q∗b by solving Problem (5) and q
∗
s by
solving Problem (6);
7 if U(q∗b ) > U(q∗s ) then
8 q∗j := q
∗
b and a
∗ := b;
9 else
10 q∗j := −q∗s and a∗ := s;
11 Qj+1 := Qj + qj∗ − δmˆ,ˆ; // Update the remained
quota after every trade.
F. Proof of Unique solution by Indifference Equations (25)
and (26)
We show the unique solution of β by the indifference
equations (25) and (26) by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Given 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 1 < B < A < C, the curve
fA(β) = A
β and the curve fBC(β) = pBβ + (1− p)Cβ have
at most one intersection in the interval β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: To show fA(β) and fBC(β) have at most one
intersection, we need to show the solution A(β) = (pBβ +
(1− p)Cβ) 1β is monotone in β.
We write
A(β) = (pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) 1β . (69)
To find first order derivative of A(β), we first write
g(β) = ln(A(β)) =
1
β
ln(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ).
Hence, the first order derivative of g(β)
g′(β) =
1
A(β)
A′(β),
which implies
A′(β) = g′(β)A(β)
=(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) 1β [− 1
β2
ln(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ)
+
1
β
1
pBβ + (1− p)Cβ (pB
β lnB + (1− p)Cβ lnC)]
=
(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) 1β
β2(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) [β(pB
β lnB + (1− p)Cβ lnC)
− (pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) ln(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ)]
=
(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) 1β
β2(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) [(pB
β lnBβ + (1− p)Cβ lnCβ)
− (pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) ln(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ)]. (70)
Then we study the second order derivative of the function
h(x) = x lnx:
h′′(x) > 0,
which implies
h(px1 + (1− p)x2) < ph(x1) + (1− p)h(x2).
Hence, we know that
− (pBβ + (1− p)Cβ) ln(pBβ + (1− p)Cβ)
+ (pBβ lnBβ + (1− p)Cβ lnCβ) > 0, (71)
and then
A′(β) > 0.
Since A(β) is monotone in β, we prove Theorem 5.
From Theorem 5, we can find the unique β value by solving
the indifference equations. After we find the β value, we
substitute this value into (26) only to find the value of λ,
because the λ in both sides of (25) can be cancelled, and then
(25) is not a function in λ. Since (26) is a linear equation in
λ, we can find the unique solution of λ.
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